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Abstract 
In 2001 the Halliday Report, Making Punishments Work: A Review of the Sentencing 
Framework for England & Wales devised a sentencing framework where sentences – 
custodial and non-custodial - meant what they said, benefited offenders and society, and 
ultimately made sense. The new framework was designed to successfully rehabilitate 
offenders, reduce re-offending and reserve prison for those offenders that justify it by 
creating novel but ingenious ways of changing the attitudes and behaviours of offenders. 
The framework was to be one that generated public confidence. Changes were 
proposed of such magnitude that it was believed the reform would lead to an overhaul of 
the dismal state of the sentencing framework.  
This article examines three major proposals from the Halliday report; the reform and use 
of custodial sentences and non-custodial sentences and the formulation of sentencing 
guidelines. It argues that despite specified aims the proposals have been implemented 
in such diluted ways that they have limited the chance of achieving the success 
predicted. The discussion seeks to show that despite the extensive Report, heralded by 
the government as the way forward in improving sentencing practice,  the government 
has failed to acknowledge the recommendations made and use the Report to its full 
benefit. The underlying question posed is whether the government has successfully put 
the ‘sense back into sentencing’? 
Keywords: Halliday Report, sentencing reform, custodial sentence, non-custodial 
sentence, custody plus  
 
Introduction 
In 2000 under Jack Straw’s leadership, the Home Office commissioned a report into the 
sentencing framework in England and Wales because there was a dire need for a 
sentencing framework which ‘sends a clear, tough message about sanctions [as]…it 
must be made far clearer to offenders what the consequences of their actions will be, 
without ambiguity.’1 Thus the report Making Punishments Work: A Review of the 
                                                 
1
 Home Office press release, Home Secretary Announces Sentencing Framework Review, (16 
May 2000). 
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Sentencing Framework for England & Wales - the Halliday Report (hereinafter the 
Report) - was born.2 Conducted by John Halliday,3 the Report fostered ambitious 
initiatives that were proposed in the pre-election policy document Criminal Justice: The 
Way Ahead, a strategy which promoted aims such as ‘ensuring that punishments fit the 
criminal as well as the crime,’ and establishing a sentencing framework that focuses on 
‘crime reduction as well as punishment for the immediate crime.’4  
 
When the Report was completed in 2001 David Blunkett had superseded Jack Straw as 
Home Secretary. Its release was subject to a great deal of hype and it was boldly stated 
that the underlying principle was to put ‘the sense back into sentencing’5 because ‘the 
public are sick and tired of a sentencing system that does not make sense.’6 As a 
consequence the government set about implementing the recommended proposals and 
further publications were released based on the foundation John Halliday had created. 
The most important of these publications came in the form of a White Paper: Justice for 
All, and a new Criminal Justice Bill which became the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 
2003). In Justice for All the Home Office vowed, ‘our goal is strong, safe communities.’ 
This, it was claimed, meant being tougher on offenders, focusing more on the victim and 
giving the police and Crown Prosecution Service the resources necessary to bring more 
offenders to justice.7 The government claimed the Criminal Justice System (CJS) had 
become less effective and stressed its commitment to creating ‘a system that meets the 
needs of society and wins the trust of citizens, by convicting the guilty, acquitting the 
innocent and reducing offending and reoffending.’8 
The White Paper provided a hard line and, therefore, vote-winning approach to how this 
would be achieved claiming: 
the proposals …form a coherent strategy, from the detection of offences to 
the rehabilitation of offenders, designed to focus the CJS on its purpose - 
                                                 
2
 Home Office, Making Punishments Work: A Review of the Sentencing Framework for England & 
Wales, (2001). 
3
 former Director of Criminal Justice Policy at the Home Office. 
4
 Home Office, Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead, Cm 5074, (2001), p.10.  
5
 Blunkett, D, ‘Putting the Sense Back into Sentencing,’ (2002) 166 Justice of the Peace 320. 
6
 Home Office, Justice for All, (2002) Cm 5563, para.5.2. 
7
 Ibid. Executive Summary. 
8
 Ibid.  para.0.1. 
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fighting and reducing crime and delivering justice on behalf of victims, 
defendants and the community.9 
It is clear from the Report and the White Paper that many of the sentencing proposals 
were geared at producing the ‘coherent strategy’ the government promised. However, by 
the time the proposals reached the Criminal Justice Bill they had significantly changed in 
form, were watered down and their future was uncertain. The CJA 2003 was supposed 
to be the culmination of the effort put into creating a new sentencing framework. The 
Explanatory Notes state that Part 12 of the Act contains statutory measures that are 
largely based on the recommendations of the Halliday Report. Here the word ‘based’ 
should be used very loosely because the provisions are not exactly as the Report 
proposed. While some proposals do exist in their original form others have changed 
significantly, and it is likely that they will never see the light of day. 
1 Making Sense of Custodial Sentences 
In assessing the shortcomings of the sentencing framework the Halliday Report 
examined the use of custodial sentences under 12 months and their practical impact on 
crime reduction and protecting the public. The Report was particularly unforgiving of the 
regime in place; the scheme was categorically rebuked on three main grounds:10 
 ‘Prison sentences of less than 12 months literally mean half what they say;’ 
 
 ‘shorter prison sentences are ill-equipped to do anything to tackle the factors 
underlying criminal behaviour, by comparison with any other sentence’; 
 
 ‘Of released prisoners, reconviction rates are higher for those who have 
served short sentences than for those released after longer terms.’11 
According to Halliday an alarming number of offenders received sentences of less than 
12 months.12 The Report also drew attention to the high reconviction rate within this 
group of offenders observing that 60% reoffended within two years of release and that 
these statistics demonstrated that sentences of less than 12 months have ‘limited effect; 
                                                 
9
 Ibid. Executive Summary. 
10
 Ibid. paras.1.16, 1.18. 
11
 Appendix 6, para.3. 
12
 Appendix 2; the Report stated that official statistics demonstrated a 67% increase of those 
receiving the sentence in the 10 years between1989-1999. 
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often offenders ‘could equally well be dealt with through a community sentence.’13 With 
the (public) concerns that short prison sentences raised the Report identified that there 
was a need to provide a sentence that required: 
those who serve short prison sentences also to undertake programmes under 
supervision in the second part of their sentence, after release from the 
custodial part, under conditions, which – if breached – could lead to return to 
custody.14 
Custody v Custody Plus 
The proposed solution to the issues of short terms of imprisonment was ‘Custody Plus,’ 
which involved a prison term followed by release on licence where an offender would 
carry out a specified community order15 ‘engaging the offender in programmes aimed at 
reducing reoffending.’16 The rationale behind Custody Plus was to provide a sanction 
that addressed the negatives attached to short-term prison sentences as there was ‘little 
opportunity to work on the factors which underlie the criminality because the time served 
in custody is so limited.’17 It is a commonly held view that rather than deter, short 
sentences ‘damage offenders with no offsetting benefit.’18 Halliday asserted that a 
sentence that could engage offenders and help them address the issues that created 
their criminality would be more beneficial than a custodial sentence of less than 12 
months. The Report proposed that the ‘custody’ element of the sanction would involve 
an initial period of imprisonment of between two weeks and three months submitting that 
this would be the equivalent of a six month sentence under the existing regime. The 
custodial period would be followed by a conditional licence of a minimum of 26 weeks 
with the total length for the Custody Plus sentence not being able to exceed 51 weeks 
when the two measures were combined. It was intended that the new sentence have the 
                                                 
13
 Appendix 6, paras.3, 3.6, 3.7. 
14
 para.3.8. 
15
 Under s182(1) CJA2003 a court may attach to a Custody Plus order: unpaid work; a specified 
activity; an accredited programme, a curfew, a prohibited activity, exclusion from a particular 
place, supervision (by way of attending appointments) or presence at an attendance centre. 
16
 Ashworth, A., Sentencing and Criminal Justice, (2005, Cambridge University Press) p.279. 
17
Justice for All, para. 0.10 
18
 Rex, S., and Tonry, M., ‘Reconsidering sentencing and punishment in England and Wales’, in 
same eds., Reform and Punishment The Future of Sentencing, (2002, Cullompton, Willan 
Publishing) p.12. 
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ultimate consequence of bringing transparency to the sentencing system because 
‘prison sentences would mean what they said, instead of half of what they say.’19  
The potential for Net-widening 
The government had big plans for Custody Plus, evidenced in two ways. Firstly, the 
provision is enacted in the CJA 2003, and secondly, mechanisms were put in place to 
ensure it could be implemented into the sentencing framework for adoption by the 
courts. At the government’s request a comprehensive guideline was prepared 
highlighting how Custody Plus had the potential to be more onerous than the existing 
sentence and as a result should be reserved for those offences where the court is sure 
the seriousness warrants it.20 This would appear to be a widespread view. It is submitted 
that the ‘plus’ elements would inhibit an offender’s independence and freedom in much 
the same way as prison does21 as offenders would be obliged to carry out a specific 
condition intended to restrict their behaviour. The Sentencing Guidelines Council (SGC) 
highlighted the potential for the sentence to be used where a community punishment 
would have normally applied; net-widening. It was suggested that although some 
sentencers who would have previously handed out a sentence of 12 months or more 
would be drawn to a Custody Plus order, others that would ordinarily have imposed a 
community penalty could find Custody Plus more attractive because the sentence 
permits the punitive element without sacrificing the benefits of community orders.22  
The Report seeks to counteract this potential by suggesting comprehensive guidelines to 
help sentencers restrict the sentence to cases where it is applicable. Ashworth argues 
that there was always potential for Custody Plus to have a net widening effect,23 
especially as there was a high focus on increasing public confidence in the CJS in the 
Report, and also because even the most robust non-custodial penal measures do not 
rouse as much public backing as the harsher prison sentences.24 The guideline 
                                                 
19
 para.3.13 
20
 See Sentencing Guidelines Council and Sentencing Advisory Panel, Council Consults on 
Custody Plus Guideline, Press release (March 2006); SGC, Custodial Sentences of Less Than 12 
Months: Criminal Justice Act 2003, Consultation Guideline, at para.26. 
21
 Suggested in Tonry, M., Punishment and Politics, (2004, Cullompton: Willan Publishing). 
22
 Roberts, J, and Smith M., ‘Custody Plus, Custody Minus,’ in Tonry, M., Confronting Crime, 
Crime Control policy under New Labour, (2003, Cullompton: Willan Publishing). 
23
 Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, p.280. 
24
 Ashworth, p.191. 
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produced by the SGC was more than effective and it is hard to see how close adherence 
to it could not combat the net-widening disadvantage. 
The rehabilitative potential of Custody Plus 
The Report made clear the sentence was only to be used for those offenders it was 
appropriate for. Roberts and Smith argue that beginning the rehabilitative programme in 
prison was essential as ‘a foundation for subsequent, non-custodial work on the skill 
deficits and antisocial attitudes which…explain an offender’s criminal behaviour 
and…the impotence of short prison sentences’25 and provides  a useful platform for the 
rehabilitation of offenders. This in turn creates seamless sentencing where an offender’s 
transition from prison to community and the programme they have started is 
orchestrated in a way to ‘minimise discontinuity.’26 The White Paper supports this 
approach suggesting it awards the best potential for rehabilitation.27  
Critically this is where weaknesses in the sentence appear. The Report and the White 
Paper seem to wrongly equate rehabilitation in custody and rehabilitation in the 
community as having the same effect; the concept of prison being rehabilitative is an 
‘implausible rationale [because]…the very idea that imprisonment will improve human 
beings has been out of favour for so long.’28  Seamless sentencing is laudable but 
whether it is realistic to expect that rehabilitation begun in prison will work is debatable. It 
is suggested that the impact of starting a rehabilitation programme in custodial time is 
‘vanishingly small’29 mainly because of the disruptive nature of short custodial periods. 
Despite the potential issues the sentence raises the ‘plus’ elements effectively ‘rescue’ 
the sentence. In both the Halliday Report and the White Paper reasons for the ‘plus’ 
element of the sentence are well vocalised, the White Paper states that the plus 
elements are ‘designed to address the particular factors that underlie…criminal 
behaviour and cause them to reoffend.’30 
 
                                                 
25
 Roberts and  Smith, ‘Custody plus, Custody Minus,’ p.189. 
26
 Justice for All, para 10.15. 
27
 para.5.26 
28
 Roberts and Smith, ‘Custody plus, Custody Minus,’ p.189. 
29
Ibid, p.190. 
30
Justice for All, para.5.25. 
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There is a wealth of opinion confirming that short sentences are damaging,31 principally 
because little proper evaluation of the offender can be undertaken in prison and 
additionally because any programmes to ‘transform’ an offender’s attitude are often 
unsuccessful in short timescales. The entire ‘prison experience’32 is too disruptive for 
most offenders serving a short sentence to benefit in a positive way. The likelihood of 
the offender returning to the community and reoffending is highly probable, so any time 
spent in prison is as good as useless, and ultimately that has a rippling effect, affecting 
communities, crime rates and the prison population. Longer term programmes are, 
therefore, the most effective way of challenging the attitudes and behaviour that create 
criminality because custody damages the ‘social infrastructure that is likely to be 
necessary to the maintenance of a crime-free life;’33 the ‘plus’ element compensates for 
this. The White Paper rightly suggests that simply imprisoning offenders and then 
releasing them without some form of help to counteract the damaging effect of custody 
puts both an offender and the community they live in at risk.34 
Gaining public confidence 
Custody Plus was presented as useful and effective in providing punishment on two 
levels. Initially, adequately punishing the offender and secondly, punishing the offender 
in a way that sufficiently appeals to the public. Evident by the onerous nature of the 
sentence is the requirement of adequate punishment. However, whether the sentence is 
acceptable in the public’s eyes is an interesting point raising some controversial issues. 
A positive aspect of the sentence is that it provides a punitive ingredient which 
consequently distinguishes the sentence from a community order, which ‘might appear 
insufficiently punitive.’35 There may be some truth in the theory36 that the public, 
somewhat naively, consider custodial sentences to be the best way of dealing with 
                                                 
31
 Tonry, Rex, Howard League for Penal Reform, Sentencing Advisory Panel, Sentencing 
Guidelines Council etc.. 
32
 Settling into prison and a routine, making friends, seeing counsellors etc. 
33
 Roberts and Smith, ‘Custody Plus, Custody Minus,’ p.196. 
34
 Justice for All, ch.5.  
35
 Roberts and Smith, p.189. 
36
 Advanced by both Ashworth and Tonry. 
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crime, punishing offenders and in turn keeping them safe, but that in reality the exact 
opposite is true for reducing reoffending,37  
it might be argued that more and longer prison sentences ought to deter 
criminals from offending and re-offending but the evidence casts doubt on the 
marginal, general or individual deterrent effect of increasing custodial 
sentences.38 
This is acknowledged in the Report39 and is the basis for promoting sanctions that 
involve rehabilitative programmes, albeit the Report actually proposed ‘to win the public’s 
confidence by supplying ‘effective’ sentences which the public is presumed to desire out 
of self-interest.’40 Instead of focusing the public’s mind on the rehabilitative potential of 
the sentence the government directed public attention to the punitive quality of the 
sentence because the government believed that sentences need ‘rigorous enforcement 
to command public confidence.’41 Actions such as these will give the public confidence 
that the government is being ‘tough on crime’ but in turn it defeats the key purpose of 
reducing the prison population. 
Policy makers do, to a certain extent, need to make sure the public are happy with the 
decisions taken, partly to ensure they stay in power and also because 
any plausible strategy to win public confidence without crass appeal to penal 
populism is likely to require an imaginative campaign to increase the public’s 
knowledge about how security is and is not put at risk by offenders in our 
midst – and about how little sentencing and sentences have to do with it.42  
While advocating rehabilitative programmes as the most effective in reducing crime and 
protecting the public, the general public has proved less receptive. Sanctions therefore 
need to ‘punish’ offenders in ways in which the public understands. Imprisonment is 
                                                 
37
 As evidence shows that a large majority of people sentenced to short custody re-offend, 
demonstrated in the 60% reoffending rate. 
38
 Ashworth, A., ‘Criminal Justice Reform: Principles, Human Rights and Public Protection,’ 
(2004), Criminal Law Review, Jul, 516-532 at p.520. 
39
 Appendix 6 
40
 Roberts and Smith, p.189. 
41
 At para.5.48. 
42
 Roberts and Smith, p.189. 
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popular because it awards ‘immediate gratification’43 which it is suggested the public 
would happily, but possibly, unwittingly trade for security.  
The ‘Sentence of Choice?’ 
The government intended to implement Custody Plus in autumn 2006, but as this 
deadline approached it was overtaken by the need to prioritise prison and probation 
resources for serious offenders.44 It is surprising, given the government realised the 
potential of the measure, that it is not going to be implemented. Custody Plus, although 
inventive and novel had the capability to be an effective sentence for the group of 
offenders it was designed to target. Custody Plus is now sitting on the statute book 
gathering dust. The government has not offered any substantive explanation as to why it 
is not being implemented, nor if it ever will. However, given the commission of guidelines 
by the SGC it is hard to imagine why the government would encourage such an intensive 
approach if they did not want to implement it. In devising the new sentence the Report’s 
intention was to make Custody Plus the ‘sentence of choice’45 for the types of offenders 
who routinely received short prison sentences. Seemingly it does not matter any longer 
what Custody Plus could have done. 
2 Non-Custodial Sentences: Assessing Community Penalties 
The Halliday review acknowledged that the current regime regarding community 
sentences was less than satisfactory; the ‘proliferation of community penalties over the 
past 10 years…complicated the statute book and increased the risks of inconsistent 
sentencing,…[especially in terms of] content and enforcement.’ The review also seemed 
concerned with the image community penalties had attracted and that they were not 
viewed as ‘sufficiently punitive’ due to a ‘lack of clarity in their stated aims.’46 In order to 
combat the confusion created by having various community orders Halliday suggested 
that it would make more sense to create a ‘single, non-custodial penalty with specified 
ingredients.’47 Halliday observed that ‘the law needs to be simplified and made more 
                                                 
43
ibid, p.191. 
44
 Home Office, Rebalancing the criminal justice system in favour of the law-abiding majority 
Cutting crime, reducing reoffending and protecting the public, (Home Office, 2006). 
45
 Justice for All,  para.2.36 
46
 para.0.17. 
47
 para.6.6. 
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understandable to the community, sentencers and offenders’48 and so promoted a 
generic ‘community punishment order’49 comprising of different requirements. 
It would appear from the Report that Halliday expected re-branding the sentence to be 
the proverbial ‘magic wand’ that would wave away the main issues with community 
punishments, however it is suggested this belief was misconceived. The very idea that a 
single generic name could create consistency is criticised by Taylor as ‘optimistic…since 
consistency can hardly be achieved simply by giving all community orders the same 
name.’ He asserts that ‘consistency will depend upon how the new ‘community sentence’ 
is used, and on the number and complexity of requirements which are written into it by 
sentencers and not on what the new measure is called.50 Rex suggests that the name as 
it was proposed obscured some of the purposes of sentencing that are so notably 
promoted in the Report as it ‘does not acknowledge the aims of crime reduction and 
reparation’ which the Report intends to reconcile with community penalties arguing that  
if the intention is to make the public believe that a community order is indeed 
a ‘punishment’ by calling it such, one suspects that this will prove futile. 
Worse, such a name may well obscure the constructive aspects of the 
sanction that might attract public support.’51 
Opinion as to the single generic name was always going to be divided. Rex observes 
that ‘the public, and offenders, seem more likely to understand what an order means 
when its name describes the activity involved.’52 Whatever the opinion, the White Paper 
although stating ‘very little about the details’53 accepted the proposals: 
there was a high level of support for changing the existing arrangements for 
community sentences…they are still not tough enough nor do they allow the 
sentence to be matched to the individual offender.’54 
Halliday’s model for the elements a community penalty should include was closely 
followed by the government when the CJA 2003 was enacted.55 By offering a ‘menu’ of 
                                                 
48
 para.6.2. 
49
 The term that Halliday chose to refer to all the orders. 
50
 Taylor, R., et al., Blackstone’s Guide to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, (2004, Oxford University 
Press) p.181. 
51
 Rex, S.,’Reinventing community penalties; the role of communication,’ in Rex and Tonry, 
Reform and Punishment, p.141. 
52
 Rex, ‘Reinventing community penalties,’ p.142. 
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 Ashworth,  Sentencing and Criminal Justice, p.313. 
54
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options Halliday hoped that the sentences would become more flexible. Halliday’s 
specification that in imposing a community penalty courts ‘must consider the aims of 
punishment, reparation and prevention of reoffending,’56 has been criticised. Taylor 
asserts that it is ‘very unsatisfactory to say that sentencers must ‘balance’ aims which 
are prima facie conflicting, such as deterrence and reparation, or punishment and 
rehabilitation.’57 
Using the Community Sentence 
Community orders became available in April 2005 for offences committed on or after that 
date, as a result two sentencing schemes were running in parallel while the number of 
offenders sentenced under the ‘old’ scheme gradually decreased.58 By December 2005 
three times as many new orders as old were being made,59 and by July 2006 the number 
of new orders had risen to 71% with only 7% of sentences being for ‘old’ orders.60 
Statistics also revealed how many requirements were being attached to these new 
community orders: around half had one requirement, one-third had two requirements 
and just under 20% had three or more requirements.61 The most common requirement 
was ‘unpaid work’ now dubbed ‘Community Payback’ with 65% of offenders being 
assigned to it. This large number is not unsurprising because the government placed 
much emphasis on its significance as evidenced in a recent Home Office Report that 
states, ‘we think that unpaid work should be at the heart of community sentences, 
because it is about offenders making amends to the community for the harm they have 
done.’62 The government intends the trend in ‘unpaid work’ being the most used 
community sentence to continue, ‘we expect the number of hours of unpaid work done 
by offenders to rise from 5 million hours in 2003 to approaching 10 million in 2011.’63 The 
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 s177 CJA 2003; these include inter alia  programmes to tackle offending behaviour, electronic 
monitoring, curfew and exclusion orders. 
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 para.6.13. 
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 Taylor,et al,  Blackstone’s Guide to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, (2004, London, Blackstone 
Press) p.176. 
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 Mair, G., et al., The use and impact of the Community Order and the Suspended Sentence 
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Home Office, A Five Year Strategy for Protecting the Public and Reducing Re-offending, (2006, 
Cm 6717), at p.5 (Executive Summary). 
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government also claims 3 million hours of unpaid work was carried out in 2007 alone and 
that based on the National Minimum Wage this is the equivalent of £33 million benefiting 
local communities.64 It would seem the government is fond of its new community 
sentence order and pleased with the way it is progressing, the reoffending rates of those 
on community orders is yet to be released but the government would have us believe it 
looks positive, it would seem that at least one of the Report’s proposals has been 
implemented in a way that allows the measure to appreciate some if not most of its 
potential. 
Suspended Sentences of imprisonment 
In line with Halliday’s desire to revolutionise sentences came proposals for a new 
suspended sentence. The original suspended sentence had earned itself - perhaps 
legitimately - the label of offenders ‘walking free’65 and as such had ‘fallen into disuse’66 
and was ‘effectively on life support.’67 As a result the Halliday Report identified a need to 
change the existing suspended sentence in a manner that complemented the other 
sanctions proposed. The new suspended sentence was deemed an ‘intermediate 
sanction’ and would involve ‘a new sentence of suspended imprisonment combined with 
(in effect) a community sentence,’68 in essence although an offender would not spend 
any time in prison they would be required to adhere to requirements derived from a 
community sentence. 
The new measure was thus promoted as a ‘conditional’ prison sentence, in reality the 
sentence is much more reconcilable with Halliday’s model for community orders. The 
Report was keen to reiterate that ‘the prison sentence is suspended, and provided that 
the community sentence is observed, is never invoked,’69 Thus the sentence would be in 
effect conditional. The proposal for the new suspended sentence was developed further 
in the White Paper which rebranded the sentence as ‘Custody Minus,’ stating that an 
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 Offenders on community sentences have paid back £33m in unpaid work this year, 27 
December 2007, http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/newsrelease271207a.htm 
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 Roberts and Smith, ‘Custody Plus, Custody Minus,’ p.200. 
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 Tonry, M., Alternatives to Prison, (2004, Cullompton, Willan Publishing), p.306. 
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offender would be required to undertake ‘a demanding programme of activity in the 
community’70 which would be made up from a range of the community sentence options.  
The new suspended sentence was adopted by the CJA 2003. A prison sentence can be 
suspended for a maximum of two years if an offender’s custodial time is between 28 and 
51 weeks for a single offence71 or 65 weeks for two or more offences.72 During the time 
in which the sentence is suspended the offender is to carry out requirements in the 
community from the full range available under a community sentence.73 The White Paper 
was at pains to reiterate that the sentence was ‘more rigorous than existing provisions’74 
particularly as ‘any breach will lead to immediate imprisonment.’75 It could be argued that 
this was a way of incorporating Halliday’s sentiments that adding the immediate 
imprisonment element ‘should make a significant difference to the perceived ‘toughness’ 
of the ‘toughest’ community penalties.’76 The White Paper’s statement on immediate 
imprisonment on any breach of a community sentence is extremely arbitrary and 
unforgiving. The zero tolerance approach runs counter to the mentality of the Report 
however it reinforces the government’s ethos of ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of 
crime.’77 The focus was meant to be on avoiding custodial sentences where possible and 
as a result it is hard to see how the Report and White Paper intended on reconciling this 
with sending offenders to prison on any breach of a condition. 
The imposition of an immediate imprisonment qualification for breaches was bound to 
receive a mixed reception. On the one hand the media and public were almost largely 
guaranteed to be in support of the sentence after all it represents the hard-line approach 
desired. Academics and human rights groups on the other hand perhaps unavoidably 
were going to take an opposite stance and be critical of the measure, especially in its 
actual application. Maybe the error was with the government’s stated intent that 
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offenders would have ‘the threat of imprisonment hanging over them’78 whilst they 
carried out their community order. 
Doomed from the start? 
It was suggested before the sentence was implemented that a major downfall was that it 
‘takes no account of predictable high rates of failure to comply with conditions.79 Tonry 
argued that ‘many offenders, probably a substantial majority violate conditions’80 upon 
their release and as a result there are important practical reasons to doubt that the 
immediate imprisonment proposal would work. The most pertinent reason the 
suspended sentence would fail is that the imprisonment element would, instead of 
decreasing the prison population, cause it to increase.81 There was dissatisfaction with 
the way in which the sentence was structured; its poor organization suggests either plain 
‘ignorance’ on the government’s part or equally a wish to appear ‘tough.’82 Tonry 
confirms that the only way forward would be for those imposing the sentence to resist 
the temptation to imprison offenders on any failure and that a better approach would be 
to assess breaches on a case-by-case analysis or build ‘flexibility’83 into the breach 
provisions or ‘willful circumvention of breach rules by probation officers and 
magistrates.’84   
Suspended Sentences – What now? 
The position of the new suspended sentence is currently unclear. The Criminal Justice 
and Immigration Bill 200885 proposed their use be restricted to indictable or triable either 
way offences.86 This is because ‘the Government believes…suspended sentence orders 
have often been used in place of community rather than custodial sentences.’87 
Addressing the Magistrates Association in 2007, Jack Straw confirmed this position 
stating the government’s newly refocused position,  
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the expectation, when we introduced Suspended Sentence Orders, was that 
they would be used instead of custody, where appropriate. But it seems that 
Suspended Sentence Orders are being used instead of community 
sentences. So I think our proposals, in the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Bill, are right.88 
During the debates throughout the second reading it was clear that views on the 
continued use of the suspended sentence were mixed, one Lord remarked 
the suspended sentence is a thoroughly admirable device, it marks the 
gravity of the offence while…allowing the offender the chance, by his 
reformed behaviour, of avoiding going to prison…He has not got away with 
it…if he reoffends, he can be made to serve the remainder of his term, with 
more for the latest offence.89 
Others were clearly  not in support of the measure continuing and argued that the 
abolition of suspended sentences for summary offences ‘is a step in the right 
direction…prisons have become too much a dumping ground for the socially excluded.’90 
 
The future of the Suspended Sentence 
At the time of writing the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill is still in session but 
it is clear that the subsequent Act will significantly alter the use of the suspended 
sentence. This change has been both criticised and welcomed with suggestions 
that courts will impose immediate custodial sentences for summary offences as 
opposed to suspended sentences. The government believes that courts would be 
reluctant to impose custodial sentences for summary offences and that accordingly 
‘limiting the use of Suspended Sentence Orders to indictable-only and either way 
offences will result in a reduction in the demand for prison accommodation by 
about 400 places.’91 Consequently it would appear that an underlying, but very 
significant, issue of the adaptation of the use of suspended sentence is the crisis 
with the prison population and the lack of available spaces, and the government’s 
perception that sentencers are misusing the provision. [Postscript: it appears that 
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sections 10 and 11 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 have circumscribed 
the use of suspended sentences for summary offences]. 
 
4 Sentencing Guidelines 
In the review, it was claimed that successful implementation of the Report’s proposals 
hinged on the formation of comprehensive and detailed guidelines.   This was necessary 
because there was a substantial amount of unfettered judicial discretion which governed 
what sentences were passed and consequently led to inconsistency. Halliday 
recommended that as the judiciary and Parliament shared the burden of generating 
sentencing policy there needed to be an independent institution that stood betwixt the 
two ‘charged with implementing sentencing decisions.’92 Initially the sentiments towards 
judicial discretion seemed to leave judicial involvement in applying sentences defunct. 
The Report suggested that the impact of the sentences was so significant it was 
irrational to leave solely to judicial preference, and thus the amount of discretion 
awarded to the judiciary should be somewhat lessened. Adversely it does not 
advocate sentencing decisions left entirely up to Parliament, instead opting for a balance 
between the two,  
it seems reasonable to start from a presumption that some discretion must be left 
to those who take the decisions, within the general framework laid down by 
Parliament…if no judgement were needed, there would be no need for judges.’93 
The Report highlighted a weakness in the sentencing scheme in the form of how 
sentencing guidelines were created; existing Court of Appeal judgments were  ‘capable 
of further development…to fill existing gaps; distinguish between different levels of 
seriousness…and show how seriousness levels within various offences overlap with 
each other.’94 In addition to this the Magistrates Court had its own method for creating 
sentencing guidelines which took an entirely different form to those of the Court of 
Appeal and adherence to which remained optional. The Report was critical of both 
sentencing systems because no statute compelled either to have guidelines or follow the 
ones that were in place, further there was no check and balance system in place for the 
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guidelines themselves. Overall the Report was dissatisfied with both arrangements 
concluding that ‘having two separate sets of guidelines for the two sentencing tiers, done 
in two different ways is less than ideal.’95 The Report expressed that ‘if guidelines were 
grounded in law, there would be a firmer basis for compliance and consistency.’96  
Criticism, however, was not limited to the judiciary, the Report suggested more direction 
was needed from Parliament as although it supervised the operation of the two systems 
from a close distance ‘a clearer understanding of how far a statutory framework should 
go, and what should be left to guidelines – subject to the confidence Parliament has in 
those guidelines and their effect – would be helpful.’97 In other words the Report 
advocated a slightly more hands on approach from Parliament and a slightly less hands 
on approach from the courts which would in turn be beneficial to a new sentencing 
framework. 
Creating an ‘independent’ sentencing body 
In the review three different commission models were set out which might best manage 
the task of creating sentencing guidelines. The main variations between the models 
were as to the amount of judicial input and the degree to which the judiciary would 
control the commission. 
Option A This model involved the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal chaired by the 
Lord Chief Justice drawing input from several sources within the Criminal Justice 
System.98 Under this model the Court of Appeal would ‘prepare draft guidelines for 
consultation…under the authority conferred on it by statute’99. Option A would have 
completely preserved judicial discretion in sentencing and therefore not been a 
significant departure from the existing system. The reaction to an Option A council was 
mixed, some suggested that ‘Halliday’s option of having the Court of Appeal in effect be 
the commission or having a judicial or judicially selected commission are not unlike 
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asking a fox to provide hen-house security.’100 Other views suggested that an Option A 
model overestimated judicial capabilities, ‘a judicially run and dominated commission is 
unlikely to adopt guidelines of sufficient ambition to effect major changes in sentencing 
practice.’101  
Option C This would be an independent body appointed by the Lord Chancellor but 
whose leadership would not be limited to the judiciary and so would have a ‘more even 
mix of members, between those with sentencing responsibilities and those with more 
general qualifications.’ Halliday observed when designing the commission models that 
Option C was a ‘risky’ option and most likely to cause ‘conflict with the Court of Appeal 
and other courts.’102  
Option B This would be an independent body separate from the Court of Appeal, but 
‘under strong judicial leadership.’ It was supposed the body could work with two slightly 
different compositions. Firstly, where members would be appointed by the Lord 
Chancellor and include a required number of judges, professionals and academics, with 
the balance in favour of sentencers, or as an alternative, where the body would be made 
up entirely of sentencers but with the option of additional members with ‘prison, 
probation, research, statistical or analytical background.’103 In the Report Option B 
‘appears to have the balance of advantage, because of the breadth of sentencing 
experience that it would bring to bear on the guidelines.’104  It is submitted that the 
decision is ‘based on beliefs that cooperation and support from English judges is 
essential to a successful sentencing law overhaul.’105 In the Report there is a subtle 
suggestion that the judiciary is unlikely to support the proposals if they are not in 
charge.106  
Although it is difficult to argue that the Report is preoccupied with preserving judicial 
control of sentencing, it can be argued that it was simply not bold enough to specify 
expressly why judicial dominance should be avoided, instead skirting around the issue 
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because it recognised that ‘judges by training and ideology are especially committed to 
the desirability of judicial discretion and reluctant to establish sentencing rules that 
seriously constrain that discretion.’107 
Deciding which model to choose: White Paper recommendations 
By the time the White Paper was released the government had decided on creating a 
council ‘responsible for setting guidelines for the full range of criminal offences108  which 
would consult with the judiciary and ‘not seek to infringe upon its independence’109 but 
also ‘to make provision for Parliament to have a voice in the creation of guidelines’110 to 
‘ensure democratic engagement in the setting of guidelines.’111 Despite its bold 
statements the White Paper was only paying ‘lip service’ to the Report’s 
recommendations112 and proposed just about the weakest possible version of a 
Sentencing Guidelines Council.113   Not wanting to step on any judicial ‘toes’  the White 
Paper presented a council made up entirely of judicial members, which it claimed was 
crucial to acknowledging ‘the importance of an independent judiciary.’114  In order ‘to 
divorce the function of creating guidelines from that of deciding individual appeals…it 
was assumed an entirely judicial body was needed;’115 especially as it was recognised 
‘that the creation of sentencing guidelines is a judicial function.’116  
 
Another explanation is that too many of the responses during the consultation period 
expressed concerns about Options B and C.117 Justice118 preferred Option A and 
dismissed Option B as unlikely to work,119 
                                                 
107
 Tonry, ‘Setting sentencing policy through guidelines,’ p.83. 
108
 Justice for All, para.5.15 
109
 para.5.15. 
110
 Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, p.54. 
111
 para.5.17. 
112
 Tonry, Punishment and Politics, p.97. 
113
 Ibid. p. 92. 
114
 para.5.15. 
115
 Ashworth,, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, p.55. 
116
 Ibid. 
117
 The Church of England Board for Social Responsibility preferred Option A in their response to 
the Halliday Report. 
118
 Justice, Justice Response to the Halliday Review, (2001) 
<http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/Halliday.pdf> 
119
 No mention is made of Option C. 
Plymouth Law Review  (2008) 1 
48 
 
while Parliament should certainly be involved in setting a broad framework, 
“setting the boundaries of political permission", it should not have too much 
influence in drawing up guidelines.120 
Liberty’s response was not dissimilar; ‘conceptually, there are difficulties with fettering 
judicial discretion in sentencing by any means,’ the response went on to denounce ‘over-
intervention by the legislature into the realm of judicial discretion.’121 Liberty’s response 
was quite critical of the implication that there should be no judicial membership, 
the role of a judiciary which is independent of ill-informed public 
opinion…provides one of the key characteristics of vibrant democracy…the 
formulation of the guidelines should be led by the senior judiciary (in 
consultation with other interested groups). This is the best way to prevent 
over-politicisation and to achieve legitimacy and adherence amongst those 
who will operate them122 
 
This view is surprising because although it might be expected that Liberty be critical of 
Parliament’s involvement in guidelines, it would not necessarily be expected that Liberty 
would find little fault in judges having sole control of a sentencing council. In their 
response Liberty seems to be suggesting that the risks involved in judicial discretion are 
negligible, accepting that although it can create ‘unpredictable and inconsistent 
outcomes,’ having Parliament too involved can also have this effect. Tonry suggests that 
the government ‘proposed a sentencing council that can’t possibly achieve Halliday’s 
purposes, and creation of guidelines that can’t possibly serve as the glue that will hold a 
refashioned punishment system together,’ not due to 
evidence or ignorance, the most economical hypothesis is that the 
government wanted neither to be seen to reject so central a recommendation 
from Halliday’s Report, nor to take on the judiciary. 123  
Teething problems: The Criminal Justice Bill 
When the Criminal Justice Bill was first presented to Parliament it provided for a body 
comprised solely of judges.124 However, as the Bill advanced through Parliament the 
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form of the council changed fundamentally, the Home Secretary seemed ‘to have 
decided that an entirely judicial body could not be trusted with [such] an important social 
function.’125 In the Lords opinion was split. Lord Woolf expressed dismay at having the 
membership of the council extended to non-judicial members despite the fact that 
persons would be drawn from within the CJS: ‘if the council is to carry real clout, as it 
must if it is to be effective, its membership should be confined to the judiciary.’126 
What is also apparent from the debate during the second reading of the Bill is that not 
everyone had a problem with the council having non-judicial members, ‘while fully 
acknowledging the experience of the judiciary in sentencing, I do not see any principled 
reason why lay people should not be part of a sentencing guidelines council.’127 The 
differing opinion within the House of Lords would seem to support the preposition that 
judges 
…tend to believe that sentencing is a craft that cannot except very crudely be 
subjected to rules…Put bluntly judges centrality in the process and their 
common belief in their need for discretion mean that they often are fierce and 
effective opponents of proposed changes in sentencing policy or practice.128 
Regardless of the split in views the amendments went ahead as planned and four 
non-judicial members129 were added to the council judicial ownership of which is 
guaranteed in the Act itself, non-judicial members are not allowed a leadership 
role.130 
Abandoning principles - failure of the comprehensive guidelines approach? 
It is hard to deny that the Report’s proposals for the new SGC were not radical, after all, 
the recommendations sought to displace the status quo and bring a wider perspective to 
the task of creating sentencing guidelines. The guidelines necessary to support the new 
framework were always going to have to be of a ‘scope, complexity and specificity 
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several orders of magnitude beyond those of existing case law guidelines.’131 But there 
has to be a reason why the sentencing council never completely took the form which the 
Report wanted. Perhaps the government had an insurmountable task ahead of them and 
therefore the recommendation was never going to work in the way intended, maybe the 
scheme was just too complex. The SGC ‘remains a body with considerable authority’132 
but not the one the Report envisaged because the government ‘abandoned the 
sentencing guidelines that were the centrepiece of the recommendations.’133  
It is argued that the government did not share the aims of the Report or have the same 
opinion as to the best way to create guidelines which achieved those aims.134 While, the 
recommendations for a sentencing council were justified throughout; the Report equated 
establishing guidelines with lessening sentencing inconsistencies, creating fairness for 
offenders, reducing the prison population and thus reducing the impact on public 
expenditure. The Report suggested that these should be the primary aims of providing 
comprehensive guidelines.135 In regards to the formulation of sentencing guidelines there 
was little sign in the White Paper136 or the CJA 2003137 of increased fairness to offenders 
and consistency in application of any penalties let alone the new ones. It is suggested 
this is because the popular press, the public, and therefore the government138 is not 
really concerned with fairness to offenders, the government does not ‘much care about 
how the sentencing council will operate or what it will not accomplish.’139 This as it may 
be, the justifications behind the proposals were legitimate and the  
proposal was a good one, not just because of the concern about disparities 
but because of the financial implications of the excessive use of 
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imprisonment and the overcrowding, deteriorating conditions and increased 
suicide rates.’140 
As to the creation of comprehensive guidelines, the White Paper was not specific and 
even contradictory, at one point stating the council will be responsible for setting 
guidelines for the ‘full range of criminal offences’141 but later suggesting that changes to 
the guidelines will be incremental,142 and issued ‘as and when they are completed.’143 
The original approach was all-inclusive, not piecemeal, but perhaps the reason why the 
guidelines have continued to be implemented ‘bit by bit’ is because the ‘government 
grossly underestimated the complexity and difficulty of what’s involved in developing 
comprehensive guidelines.’144 There is no mention at all in the White Paper, the Bill or 
the CJA 2003 itself of how comprehensive the guidelines should be, which supports the 
view that the treatment of the sentencing council and guidelines by all three was ‘half-
hearted and perfunctory.’145 
Sentencing Guidelines: the Verdict 
Clearly there are differences between what the Report visualised and what was actually 
created. The SGC’s approach is wide ranging and incremental;146 guidelines are created 
on generic offence groups,147 individual offences,148 and general principles across the 
sentencing range,149 but often the projects are large and complex so inevitably they take 
time. The benefits of the process of the new SGC cannot be underestimated, the SGC is 
effective in many areas, there is some truth in the suggestion that ‘it is unthinkable now 
that we should abandon guidelines in sentencing and return to general judicial 
discretion.’150 
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The ‘production of sentencing guidelines in England and Wales is a highly consultative 
exercise,’151 the SGC has to give sufficient time for consultation in order to bring 
‘transparency and accountability’152 to the whole process, which the Report specified 
was imperative. The SGC also has to take on board the views expressed during the 
consultation periods and make changes where appropriate, but the Council rightly 
accepts that not every view can be accommodated, which ultimately means the 
guidelines are of value.153 
Conclusion – Does it make Sense? 
This article has sought to assess three major sentencing proposals from the Halliday 
Report on the sentencing framework in England and Wales and their potential and actual 
impact on the criminal justice system. As has been discussed, the Halliday Report was 
originally commissioned to radically reform the structure of the sentencing framework in 
a way that benefited both society and the offender. Most of the proposals from the 
Report were endorsed in the government White Paper and the majority of the Report is 
visible in Part 12 of the CJA 2003. Both the Report and White Paper were concerned 
with what sentences represented to the public, they were very keen for them to ‘mean 
what they say’. It could be suggested that given the state of affairs with these sentences 
it does not matter much what they mean because they no longer say anything at all!  
Despite many of the proposals having the capacity to improve the CJS it would appear 
that the government has failed to implement them effectively and seven years after the 
Halliday Report they are still having little impact.  
Custody Plus was a carefully thought out sentence with the potential to target the group 
of offenders most likely to perpetuate the problem of an increasing prison population: 
offenders on short prison sentences by challenging offenders’ behaviours and attitudes 
to crime. Though not without its pitfalls, it is astonishing that such a useful sentence has 
not at least been trialled. It would be interesting to know whether it is true that ‘the 
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implications of ‘custody plus’ are so scary that the Government dare not implement it.’154 
The position of custodial sentences is certainly no better today than seven years ago 
and on assessment of official statistics the position is worse;155 prisons are nearly full. 
The current trend of increase shows no sign of waning and the government is racking its 
metaphorical brain with how to change this. This seems somewhat ironic, especially as if 
the government had employed the resources necessary to put in place many of 
Halliday’s recommendations then the situation may not have been as bad as it is today. 
However, it clearly is not just down to the type of sentences offenders are serving, it is 
equally dependent on Labour’s ‘tough on crime’ agenda and its continued pursuit of 
pleasing the voting public. 
The government did accept Halliday’s recommendations for the new community order 
and its implementation has seen a positive step. If the government figures are to be 
believed requirements such as ‘unpaid work’ are having a significant positive and 
quantifiable impact. It would be hard to argue that 3 million hours worth of unpaid work in 
the communities the offender betrays is a bad thing. However not much is said by the 
government about the other requirements that can be imposed in a community order. 
Success rates of programmes to assist those with substance abuse problems and 
programmes to tackle reoffending are not known, nor are the figures for those who 
reoffend after a community order. Arguably there is more clarity in the types of 
community penalty offenders will undergo and the wide range means that it should be 
easily tailored to offender needs. As the community order only came into force in 2005 it 
will still be some time before the reality of what it achieves is known. Only time will tell if 
the measure stays in place. One would hope that community sanctions do not suffer the 
same potential fate the new style suspended sentence, a much improved sanction 
evident in its popularity. However research shows that sentencers have been caught by 
the net-widening trap156 and clearly the government once aware of this could not allow it 
to continue. Suspended sentences are currently in the most precarious position, the 
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government’s intention to limit their use to indictable only or triable either way offences 
will have significant effects on the sanction but with the current fashion of change it is 
conceivable it will follow in its predecessor’s footsteps and fall into disuse once again. 
The SGC is another proposal implemented in a diluted form and adapted in ways that 
make it hard for it to reach its full potential. Although it is argued the SGC does a good 
job it would appear ‘good’ just is not ‘good enough,’ speaking six years after the Report, 
John Halliday himself professed, 
the nearest thing to an independent sentencing authority in England…is 
the…SGC. My hope, in recommending a body of this sort, was that it would 
work towards a comprehensive set of guidelines…So far, there is no sign of 
either the government or the SGC seeking to develop…the strong leadership 
and imagination…needed.157 
However, it would be wrong to deny that some of Halliday’s central aims are 
unidentifiable in the SGC. There is an increased amount of transparency in the new 
process, the Council consults widely; public opinion is invited, Parliament has a degree 
of input and unfettered judicial discretion is curtailed on a case to case basis. 
It is far too easy to apportion blame on the different agencies within the CJS. Fault can 
effortlessly be placed at sentencers’ feet for net-widening with some sentences, or with 
the SGC for not implementing ‘comprehensive guidelines’, or with Halliday himself for 
producing a report that although ‘intelligently, ambitiously and professionally executed 
was misconceived.’158  This, however, simply diverts attention from those arguably most 
at fault; the government and its desire to be seen as hard on crime, because they do not 
‘wish to be pilloried for being soft on offenders.’159  Yet it is the government who is 
currently the weakest link in the sentencing framework. In order to remain in power it has 
to be seen to be doing ‘something’, crime is, in the eyes of most a taboo, and so the 
public will always hunger for assurances from those high up that crime is being tackled. 
What is evident is that not very much in the CJS is being tackled very well at the 
moment. The Halliday Report was supposed to be the beginning of a new era for 
sentencing, the government has failed to exploit its full potential and as a result things 
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are not looking good. It is argued160 that the solution to solving the problems of the CJS 
lies mainly in stopping the over-legislating of criminal justice. The government needs to 
take a step back and look at ways to make the system work more effectively instead of 
making sentences ‘tougher’. Tougher sentences do not equal less crime; they equal an 
increasing prison population.  
 
It would appear the government is still trying to find out ‘what works’ with the CJS, but 
surely they recognise that ‘nothing will ever work unless those entrusted 
with…implementation are given the necessary time, opportunity and resources to 
achieve.161 Ironically although wanting to put ‘the sense back into sentencing’ it would 
seem seven years later the government have not given the Halliday proposals the 
chance to work, instead slowly abandoning the majority of them. The government keep 
on legislating and amending and changing the CJS in an attempt ‘to persuade the public 
that with clearer goals and better integration and management of the CJS, crime 
reduction can be achieved through sentencing and punishment.’162 It must be possible 
for the government to achieve these aims. However, catastrophically failing to implement 
key proposals from the Halliday report has done nothing to help the government in its 
quest for a new sentencing framework; one that ultimately makes sense. 
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